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Abstract  
Multiple studies have investigated the development and 
use of ground-based (controller) tools to manage and 
schedule traffic in future terminal airspace. No studies 
have investigated the impacts that such tools (and 
concepts) could have on the flight-deck.  To begin to 
redress the balance, an exploratory study investigated 
the procedures and actions of ten Boeing-747-400 crews 
as they flew eight continuous descent approaches in the 
Los Angeles terminal airspace, with the descents being 
controlled using speed alone. Although the study was 
exploratory in nature, four variables were 
manipulated: speed changes, route constraints, 
clearance phraseology, and winds. Despite flying the 
same scenarios with the same events and timing, there 
was at least a 50 second difference in the time it took 
crews to fly the approaches. This variation is the 
product of a number of factors but highlights potential 
difficulties for scheduling tools that would have to 
accommodate this amount of natural variation in 
descent times.  The primary focus of this paper is the 
potential impact of ground scheduling tools on the 
flight crews’ performance and procedures. Crews 
reported “moderate to low” workload, on average; 
however, short periods of intense and high workload 
were observed.  The non-flying pilot often reported a 
higher level of workload than the flying-pilot, which 
may be due to their increased interaction with the 
Flight Management Computer, when using the aircraft 
automation to assist with managing the descent 
clearances.  It is concluded that ground-side tools and 
automation may have a larger impact on the current-
day flight-deck than was assumed and that studies 
investigating this impact should continue in parallel 
with controller support tool development.   
Study Background and Motivation 
In today’s air traffic system, an aircraft flying 
through a busy terminal area can expect to be given 
multiple speed changes, altitude level-offs, and/or 
heading vectors. Although positive Air Traffic 
Control (ATC) results in a very safe system, it is 
often not efficient for a single flight. When demand is 
low, there is more space between aircraft and 
controllers have flexibility to descend aircraft along 
an efficient descent profile.  When demand is high, 
traffic density often constrains the availability of 
these profile descents.   
The Airspace Technology Demonstration 
(ATD1) concept developed by NASA [1] aims to 
safely sustain high runway throughput while also 
enabling fuel-efficient operations. Research is being 
undertaken in advanced scheduling capabilities that 
create schedules at the runway to enable aircraft to 
fly Optimized Profile Descents (OPDs) along Area 
Navigation (RNAV) routes [2]. Aircraft on these 
descents will be cleared to the runway and then will 
be able to rely on speed to maneuver as they fly into 
and through the terminal area. This will allow an 
aircraft to maintain its place in a tightly packed 
stream by meeting its scheduled time of arrival 
(STA). The STA is allocated prior to top-of-descent 
by the ground-based scheduling system. Assuming en 
route controllers feed the Terminal Radar Approach 
Control (TRACON) with a reasonable flow, that is, 
within certain tolerances of the schedule, TRACON 
controllers would rely primarily on speed 
adjustments to bring aircraft through the TRACON 
[3].  The benefit to aircraft is a smooth, low energy 
descent that is fuel efficient and faster.  
Controller-Managed Spacing (CMS) research in 
the Airspace Operations Laboratory [4] has 
conducted a series of real-time human-in-the-loop 
simulations to investigate specific controller decision 
support tools (DSTs) for such operations. With 
relatively straight-forward display enhancements, 
TRACON controllers were able to manage dense 
arrival flows that followed OPDs along RNAV routes 
and met runway schedule times without significant 
increases in their workload (see [5] and [6] for 
accounts of this research).   
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20120016549 2019-08-30T23:12:03+00:00Z
One set of assumptions within the ATD1 
concept, and for the relevant research to date, is that 
these schedule-based, RNAV OPDs will have 
minimal impact on the flight deck. This encompasses 
primarily three sub-assumptions:  firstly, that flight 
crews will be able to fly these descents and meet the 
speed instructions issued to them; secondly, that they 
will be able to do this without significant increases to 
their workload; and thirdly, that no training is 
required. This last assumption is based on reasoning 
that the route (lateral coordinates) of an OPD RNAV 
descent is almost the same as current day Standard 
Terminal Arrival Routes (STARs).  In addition, 
altitude and speed constraints are common today, 
although not nearly as numerous as they will be in 
the future if schedule-based descents are 
implemented. Hence, it has been an assumption that 
flight crews will be able to manage these schedule-
based clearances without additional training. 
The present study was undertaken to explore the 
above assumptions; that is, to ascertain the crews’ 
ability to fly schedule-based OPDs with no prior 
training and to examine their workload level and 
aircraft management strategies.  
A secondary driver for this study was to explore 
the variation in, or range of, speeds that are 
acceptable to an airplane crew throughout their 
descent, and to inform the CMS tools regarding 
where and what limits should be set within the 
automation [7]. Current work exploring flight-deck 
interval management (FIM) [8] constrains the FIM 
automation, when used by airplane crews to control 
their descent, to issuing speeds within a ten percent 
deviation from the current speed.  It is unknown 
whether the ground-based CMS tools should also 
adhere to a ten percent speed deviation in their 
advisories or whether larger deviations would be 
acceptable to, and flyable by, flight crews.  The 
advantage of larger speed changes is that the 
automation would be able to solve bigger schedule 
mismatches using speed alone.  To intentionally 
explore the outer limits of acceptable speed 
variations, it was determined that twenty percent 
deviations to the pre-determined speed profile would 
be presented in this flight deck simulation. 
Method 
The study described in this paper was 
exploratory and broad, encompassing multiple factors 
of human-computer interaction, including workload, 
crew procedures, and the use of automation tools.  
The study was designed to address a number of 
variables but the number of conditions explored 
within each variable was limited to permit a full 
cross-comparison. Using the same airspace employed 
in the CMS studies, the TRACON around Los 
Angeles International Airport (LAX), and flying two 
of the same routes was deliberate to allow data to be 
compared if this was desirable at a later point.  As the 
key assumptions under investigation were human 
factors issues, the simulation facility with the greatest 
level of realism of those available was selected. 
The Simulation Facilities 
The study was flown in a Boeing-747-400 
simulator [9] at the NASA Ames Research Center.  It 
is a certified FAA Level D simulator and has the 
same cab configuration as a United Airlines flight 
deck (a 747-422 variant). The simulator compartment 
includes the cockpit flight deck, observer seats and an 
experimenter operator control station.  The weight 
and balance of the simulator was configured for this 
study to have an overall simulated weight of 540,000 
pounds – in the mid range for this aircraft type. The 
“motion”, the hydraulic system that creates a sense of 
moving forward when inside the cab, was turned on, 
giving the participants some level of kinesthetic and 
vestibular feedback. The additional traffic was 
generated by the Multi Aircraft Control System 
(MACS) software [10], which also generated the Air 
Traffic Controller’s screen and schedule. The 
controller used the schedule only to separate traffic 
and not to meet the aircraft STAs in this study. The 
two simulations were connected through a Higher 
Level Architecture that exchanged data to show the 
B-747 simulator on the controller’s screen and the 
traffic on the displays inside and out of the 
windshield in the cab.  
Participants 
Twenty active pilots, all currently flying for one 
of four carriers operating under CFR 14 Part 121 
(commercial), and all certified to fly a B-747, took 
part in the study as ten two-person crews.  Co-crew-
members were paired from the same carrier to ensure 
that the team could work to the same set of 
procedures, although these procedures differed across 
crews/ carriers. The participants were highly 
experienced, having a mean of 16,288 flight hours 
each. 
Routes and Airspace 
Each crew flew eight approaches through the 
Los Angeles Terminal Area (SOCAL) into LAX.  
Two arrival routes were used, one from the north-
west to the 24-Right runway and one from the east to 
the 25-Left runway.  The routes map closely onto the 
existing SADDE and RIIVR Standard Terminal 
Arrival Routes. The actual routes used had been built 
for the prior ground-side studies [5] to allow the 
aircraft to fly optimized profile descents on an 
RNAV/RNP (Required Navigation Performance) 
adaptation, giving the routes a continuous descent 
profile (CDA) from cruise altitudes through the 
STARs to the runway threshold. That is, the STAR, 
transition, and ILS approach were linked into one 
route from top to bottom of the descent. In the ground 
automation studies, all the routes were characterized 
by hard altitude and speed constraints at multiple 
waypoints through the airspace. However, in the 
present study these hard constraints were only kept 
for the SADDE route, which had hard altitude and 
speed constraints at five waypoints (DEANO, 
SADDE, CULVX, HUMEL and JETSA) (Figure 1).  
Thus, the SADDE route was flown in exactly the 
same way as in earlier CMS simulations [5].  The 
RIIVR STAR was partially converted back to a more 
‘current day’ variant of the route, with three window 
altitude constraints (at GRAMM, HABSO and 
RIIVR) (Figure 1 also), although four speed 
constraints were kept (at GRAMM, LUVYN, 
FUELR and GAATE).  
To present the routes to the participants, these 
speed and altitude constraints were added to currently 
available arrival plates of the routes.  Participants 
were given a set of these reference charts that showed 
the nominal speed and altitude profiles for the study 
and the distances between waypoints.  
The simulator was initialized 135 nautical miles 
(nmi) from the runway on both routes, putting it a 
few miles before the Top-of-Descent; it was always 
initialized at 28,000ft and at 300 knots.  Participants 
flew the RIIVR2 STAR to runway 25L four times 
and the SADDE7 STAR, with a base turn, to land on 
runway 24R four times. The scenario began with the 
crew receiving a descent clearance that cleared them 
to descend on the route to the runway. During each of 
the runs, the speed scenario that was presented, the 
phraseology used, and the winds were varied. 
Winds 
The same forecast wind profile was used for all 
runs.  Beginning at around 60 knots at 28,000ft, the 
strength of the wind gradually decreased to 7 knots at 
the runways. The wind was always out of 265°, a 
headwind aligned with the landing runways. This was 
the wind profile entered into the flight plan and the 
profile from which the simulator’s FMS (Flight 
Management System) calculated the aircraft’s 
descent profile.  In half of the runs, the actual winds 
that the simulator flew in were the same as the 
forecast winds.  In the other half of the runs, the 
simulator flew in actual winds that were ten knots 
greater than the forecast winds between 20,000ft and 
1,500ft.  Above and below these altitudes, the actual 
winds remained the same as the forecast winds.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Routes flown in SOCAL airspace 
 
 
Speed Schemes 
To test the boundaries of speed variations that 
are acceptable, this study explored a twenty percent 
deviation of speed clearances around the profile 
speeds that had been created for the controller 
automation studies [6]. The nominal speed profiles 
were developed by [6] to enable continuous descents 
that would allow aircraft to meet their STAs at the 
outer marker. They are a series of hard speed 
constraints that decelerate aircraft on the route 
through 280, 240, 210 and 180 or 170 knots to the 
outer marker.  As an aside, if pilot participants 
followed this series of speed reductions the aircraft 
would meet the current FAA regulation to be flying 
at less than 250 knots below 10,000 ft MSL. As this 
study explored a twenty percent variation from the 
nominal profile speeds, crews were asked to fly as 
fast as 340 knots (20% over 280 knots) to the first 
waypoint, on the TRACON boundary, and as slow as 
160 knots at HUMEL and GAATE. (160 knots was 
only 11% less than 180 knots (not 20%) but was 
considered to be the lowest acceptable speed over 
these waypoints.) 
Two speed schemes were created that each had 
two cycles of speed variation. One scheme was a 
“fast-to-slow” profile, where a faster speed than the 
profile was issued first (e.g., 340 knots), followed by 
the profile speed (e.g., 280 knots), then a speed 
slower than the profile speed was given (e.g., 220 
knots). The second scheme was a “slow-to-fast” 
profile, where a slower speed than the profile was 
given first, followed by the profile speed, then a 
speed faster than the profile speed was issued.  This 
second speed scheme created a number of points of 
interest, namely asking for 220 knots above 20,000ft, 
which is a “dirty” speed for the B-747 – a speed that 
is slow enough that a crew would normally deploy 
flaps; and then asking for the same speed, which is 
relatively fast, for the last 15 nmi before the outer 
marker.   
Phraseology 
The phraseology used in the study was 
manipulated to compare a variant that had been 
developed in previous ground-side studies [6] with 
current day phraseology.  “Current day” speed 
clearances were characterized as single-item 
transmissions that instructed a crew to increase or 
decrease their speed some number of indicated knots. 
“Future CMS” speed clearances contained two items. 
They instructed crews to increase or decrease their 
speed away from the profile speed (written on the 
chart constructed for the study) but also told them 
where they could resume the speed profile (based on 
the chart) using the phrase “until”.  For example, the 
controller issued a clearance: “Increase speed to 340 
until DEANO, then resume published speeds.” This 
clearance instructed the crew to increase their speed 
from their present speed of 300 knots to 340 knots 
and stay at this speed until close to the waypoint 
DEANO, when they should slow to the speed shown 
on the chart to cross DEANO at 280 knots.  In the 
current day condition, the controller issued a first 
clearance to “increase speed to 340” followed by a 
second clearance close to DEANO to “reduce speed 
to 280.”  So, twice as many speed clearances were 
issued in the current day phraseology condition 
compared to the future-CMS condition, generating 
twice as many speed transmissions, but the 
clearances in the future-CMS condition were longer. 
Although the two conditions differed in their 
phrasing of the speed clearances, exactly the same 
increases and reductions were given in both 
conditions. 
Study Design 
The variables for the study were the speed 
scheme used, the phraseology type used and the type 
of constraints (routes) flown.  Each variable had two 
conditions, e.g., the phraseology was either “current 
day” or “future CMS”.   This generated a 2x2x2 
matrix (2 phraseology x 2 speed scheme x 2 
constraint type) that translated to eight Scenarios 
representing each cell of the matrix.  These eight 
scenarios were each presented once to each crew in a 
semi-random order.  (A randomized matrix was 
adjusted to ensure that no Scenario occupied the 
same place in the run order too often.)  Additionally, 
a crew flew half of their Scenarios with actual winds 
equaling forecast winds and the other half with actual 
winds being 10 knots greater than forecast winds.  
Crews participated in the study for one day.  
They were briefed in the morning and given time to 
review the charts and discuss their procedures and 
“flight plan” as a crew. They were specifically not 
given a chance to fly a training run to meet the 
assumptions of the concept.  Crews flew four runs 
before lunch and four after, with each run taking 
approximately 35 minutes.  There was a 10 to 15 
minute break between each scenario. 
Data Collection 
Data were recorded for each run through a 
variety of media. The B-747 simulator’s data 
collection logs recorded all flight parameters and cab 
flight-panel button states.  A Voice-Over-Internet-
Protocol system recorded the crew-controller 
communications, and in-cab video equipment 
recorded flight-deck conversations and four views of 
the general cab environment and the flight displays. 
Participants were asked to respond to a real-time 
workload prompt, using an ATWIT-based procedure 
[11], that was recorded on a stand-alone laptop and 
observers recorded flight crew actions using a pencil-
and-paper scheme. MACS’ data collection logs 
recorded an Air Traffic Controller view of each run. 
Following each run, the participants completed a one-
page questionnaire that included questions about their 
workload and problem solving. At the end of the 
study, participants completed a longer questionnaire 
asking more generic questions about the concept, and 
took part in a short debriefing discussion.  
In addition, the research team flew the same 
eight descents with the same clearances, specifically 
trying to maintain the vertical profile of the descent.  
All the same data logs as for the study crews were 
collected but none of the subjective data.  The 
research team’s data is labeled “baseline” below. The 
following section describes results from a sample of 
the analyses conducted thus far. 
Results 
As noted above, the aims of the study were 
exploratory:  to document how flight deck crews 
managed requests for large speed changes while on a 
CDA and to gain feedback about the workload 
involved and the acceptability of the clearances. 
Feasibility  
Of the 80 approaches flown, three were 
excluded from the data because a simulator artifact or 
pilot error meant the crew did not complete the flight.  
Of the remaining 77 approaches, 75 (97%) were 
completed with the crew landing on their assigned 
runway at LAX.  In two of the flights, the crew 
elected to perform a missed-approach because they 
were not stable on the approach at the designated 
position according to their company procedures.  In 
these two instances, although the routes and winds 
for the runs were different, the future-CMS 
phraseology was being used and the speed scheme 
was slow-to-fast, so the crews were trying to reduce 
their speed from 220 knots to around 150 knots in 
less than 11 nmi. 
The time it took crews to fly the approaches was 
explored to investigate the potential implications of 
the aircraft performance variation upon ground 
scheduling algorithms.  The 77 approaches, from the 
point when the first speed clearance was given to the 
aircraft flying over the outer marker (JETSA or 
LIMMA), varied by three minutes – from 17 min 
26sec to 20 min 29sec.  Figure 2 plots the fastest and 
the slowest descent for each of the eight scenarios 
that crews flew.  Although the SADDE route with the 
procedure turn was five miles longer between the 
first speed clearance and the outer marker, it took less 
time to fly, with the slowest flight time being 19 min 
25sec and the fastest time being 17 min 26sec, a 
variation of two minutes in the time to fly the 
descent.  The RIIVR route had a fastest flight time of 
17 min 35sec and a slowest flight time of 20 min 
29sec, a slightly larger variation of 2 min 53sec. 
What is striking about these times is not their 
absolute value but the size of their variation 
considering that the conditions (route and clearances) 
were the same for each crew in each scenario. 
 
 
Figure 2. Fastest and Slowest Flight Times for 
Each Route 
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Of the eight scenarios presented, Scenario1 had 
the least variation (only 50 seconds) in the time it 
took the ten study crews to fly it.  This scenario was 
on the SADDE route and combined the future CMS 
phraseology with a fast-to-slow speed scheme.  Due 
to its hard constraints and conditional phraseology, 
this was ranked by the research team as one of the 
harder Scenarios to fly of the set. Scenario7 had the 
greatest variation (2 min 32sec) in the time it took 
study crews to fly its descent.  This scenario was 
physically the opposite of Scenario1 as it was on the 
RIIVR route with a slow-to-fast speed scheme.  The 
only similarity between the two scenarios was the 
phraseology the Air Traffic Controller used to issue 
the speed clearances, which was the future-CMS 
format. It could be that some combination of window 
constraints and/or a slow-to-fast speed scheme 
increases the variability in the methods crews used to 
fly the approach. 
The baseline crew took the longest to fly three of 
the four RIIVR scenarios, with the exception of 
Scenario7.  The baseline crew also took the shortest 
time to fly three of the four SADDE scenarios, with 
the one exception for the SADDE routes being 
Scenario1.  In general, therefore, the baseline crew, 
who knew the scenarios and whose strategy was to 
maintain their vertical profile over other parameters, 
provide the upper timing boundary for the RIIVR 
route and the lower timing boundary for the SADDE 
route.  This does not refute the possibility that a 
variation in crew methods leads to different descent 
times but adds an interesting finding that, in general, 
strategy variations led to participant-crews 
descending faster than the baseline crew on the 
RIIVR route and slower than the baseline crew on the 
SADDE route. 
Figure 3 shows the indicated airspeed (IAS / 
calibrated airspeed) flown by each crew, from the 
point of the first speed clearance to the runway, in 
Scenario1 and Scenario7. The graph for Scenario1 
(Figure 3a) shows that, except for a period when they 
received two speed reductions (between 
approximately 70 to 50 nmi from the runway), crews 
were flying close to the same speeds at the same 
distances from the runway, e.g., close to 220 knots at 
40nmi out. This essentially means that their descents 
were more uniform in terms of speed, and hence 
time. The graph for Scenario7 (Figure 3b) provides a 
contrast and some explanation for the greater 
variation in the time it took crews to fly this Scenario.  
In this graph there are far fewer points where crews 
were flying close to the same speeds at the same 
distance from the runway.  In this graph, the point 
where all crews were flying close to 290 knots at 40 
nmi out is an exception. More representative is the 
point 10nmi before, at 50nmi from the runway, where 
there is more than a 40-knot difference in the speeds 
crews were flying at the same point in the run. For 
this Scenario, crew descents were diverse, or non-
uniform in terms of speed, and hence time. 
Figure 3. Speed Profiles for 10 Crews and the 
Baseline Crew for Scenario1 and Scenario7 
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b) Scenario7 
Reported Workload  
Since all the scenarios were feasible but varied 
in the time required to fly them, the degree of 
workload they imposed on the crew was explored. 
The real-time workload ratings, given every five 
minutes by both members of the crew during each 
run, were reviewed to explore whether there was any 
relationship between the study conditions and pilot 
perceived workload. Participants were prompted to 
rate their workload on a 1 to 7 scale (from “very low” 
to “very high”) (see [11] for details), usually four 
times during a run. These ratings were separated into 
those given by the flying-pilot and those given by the 
non-flying pilot.  Figure 4 shows the average 
workload reported by both the flying-pilot and the 
non-flying-pilot for each scenario. 
 
 
Figure 4. Mean Real-time Workload for Each 
Flying Position by Each Route (with Standard 
Error) 
Over the whole study, workload was rated as 
“moderate to low” (M=2.82, SD=1.39) and this is 
broadly true for each scenario, since all but one of the 
average ratings shown in Figure 4 is around 3 on the 
scale.  On average, the non-flying pilot rated his/her 
workload as higher than that of the flying-pilot in six 
of the eight scenarios.  Only Scenario3 and Scenario8 
were rated as having more load on average by the 
flying-pilot. The only condition that these two 
scenarios share is the speed scheme – they both used 
the slow-to-fast scheme, suggesting that pilots may 
have had to manipulate the controls more actively 
when very slow at altitude and fast on final approach.  
The non-flying pilots’ mean workload ratings do not 
show the same pattern as they tend to be higher for 
the RIIVR approaches than the SADDE approaches. 
The workload data were re-sorted by the 
scenarios’ speed scheme, i.e., workload for Scenarios 
1, 2, 5 and 6 were grouped and compared to the 
workload for Scenarios 3, 4, 7 and 8 (Figure 5).  
There is a significant difference in flying-pilots’ 
workload ratings (Z=2.47, n=138, p=0.013) when 
tested using a Wilcoxon-Signed-Rank test, indicating 
that the flying pilot reported the slow-to-fast speed 
schemes generated more load for them (M=2.83) than 
the fast-to-slow schemes (M=2.44); although it must 
be noted that these mean load ratings are still  
“moderate to low”. A review of the flying pilots’ 
mean workload scores indicates they incurred higher 
workload especially in the last phase of the approach, 
as the final workload rating (out of 4) reported in 
three of the four scenarios produced a mean that is 
higher than those the pilots gave to the previous 
prompts in the run. There is no significant difference 
in the non-flying pilots’ workload between the speed 
schemes. 
 
 
Figure 5. Mean Real-time Workload for Each 
Flying Position by Scenario Speed Scheme (with 
Standard Error) 
To verify whether crews experienced different 
workload based on the speed scheme presented, the 
responses participants gave to the workload questions 
in their post-run questionnaire were sorted by the 
speed scheme of the run and an overall mean 
calculated.  Four scales from the NASA TLX [12] 
were asked in the post-run questionnaire and 
participants responded on a 1-7 (“very low” to “very 
high”) scale. Figure 6 illustrates that, post-hoc, 
participants responded more strongly that the slow-
to-fast speed scheme generated the most workload.  
They rated both the effort required and the time 
pressure they felt to be significantly higher in the 
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slow-to-fast scheme (Zeffort & Ztime pressure=3.86, 
n=80, p=0.000).  However, they also felt more 
frustrated (Z=2.97, n=80, p=0.003) but no less 
successful.  Further supporting data comes from a 
fifth question that asked whether the speed changes 
issued in the scenario were reasonable.  Participants 
rated the fast-to-slow speeds as more reasonable (Z=-
2.46, n=80, p=0.014; Mfast-to-slow=4.6) than the 
slow-to-fast speed schemes (M=4). 
 
Figure 6. Mean Retrospective Workload by 
Scenario Speed Scheme (with Standard Error) 
Crew Responses to Speed Clearances   
Despite the higher load, very few crews refused 
clearances.  In fact, only two crews refused a 
clearance (said “unable” as a response to an 
instruction).  However, crews did express their 
unease in slightly less direct ways. 
Table 1 below lists the relatively few responses 
that crews gave to clearances that were not simply 
read-backs and acceptances of the instruction. As 
noted, there were only two straight rejections of a 
clearance, when a crew did not read back the 
instruction but said they were “unable” to complete 
it.  These were both during slow-to-fast speed 
schemes when the ATC asked the crew to slow to 
220 knots above 10,000ft.  However, this does not 
mean that crews did not experience some difficulty 
when flying the clearances.  They queried or 
requested a modification to the clearance at least 25 
times.  Since there were 590 planned speed 
clearances given during the study, crews queried 
4.2% of the instructions issued.  A further 2.5% (15) 
of the clearances issued were accepted but later 
reported to be unobtainable.    
 
Table 1. Crew Queries and Statements to ATC 
Communication Count 
Unable 2 
High/fast over way-
point 
15 
Clarify / query 14 
Request a change  5 
Request different speed 6 
Other 1 
Total 43 
 
Categorizing the queried clearances suggests 
there were three main ways that crews dealt with a 
clearance that was going to be problematic to 
execute. One method was to accept the clearance and 
then later tell the controller that they could not 
achieve one or more aspects of it, e.g., “We’ll be a 
little high at SADDE”. A second method was to 
query or clarify the clearance as it was given; and the 
third method was to request a different speed that was 
less extreme at the time the clearance was given.  The 
first method worked the best for the crews – it is 
obviously impractical for the controller to ask them 
to meet an altitude when they were already flying 
over the waypoint. If it had been important for the 
airplane to meet the restriction, there would have 
been little the controller could have done to save the 
situation and, if the controller had been working to 
meet a schedule, it may have made this harder to 
achieve. With the second and third methods of 
requesting and suggesting different speeds, the 
controller would have been able to re-organize and 
re-strategize earlier if necessary. 
In the debrief discussions, some crews described 
that a fourth way to offset the impact of the speed 
clearances was to achieve them slowly. They felt 
gradual acceleration and deceleration would be more 
acceptable to passengers and was easier for them to 
manage.  This view was not shared by all crews; 
others said they would fly “however we need to to 
make it happen.” These differences in strategies are 
apparent in Figure 3b above where crews who were 
trying to achieve speeds quickly and those who were 
trying to achieve them slowly resulted in as much as 
a 50 knot difference in IAS over some waypoints. It 
is differences like this in crew strategies that 
contribute to the three-minute variation in the time-
to-fly the descent discussed above. 
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Discussion 
Of the four variables explored in this study, the 
speed manipulation seemed to have the greatest 
impact on crews’ workload, based on their self-
reports, and on their responses to the controllers’ 
clearances.  In debriefing discussions crews 
specifically cited the very slow “dirty” speeds above 
20,000ft and the very fast speeds just before the outer 
marker as the most problematic clearances. While 
some said these extremes were “not unreasonable but 
not typical” others said they were “ridiculous”.  
Crews had a variety of reasons for disliking the slow 
speed at altitude, including configuration 
management, care of the equipment and fuel 
efficiency. Others seemed to dislike the following 
clearance to increase speed rather than the initial 
slow speed clearance per-se, chiefly because they had 
to reconsider their earlier configuration decision. 
Crews disliked the fast-before-the-outer-marker 
speed because it was difficult to achieve a stabilized 
approach, as stated by company procedures, 
immediately after having to hold a fast speed.  As 
company procedures differed, a “stabilized approach” 
was harder to achieve for some crews than others. 
A general observation from this study is that 
“extreme” clearances, which issue large changes in 
speed, can be difficult to achieve and can 
substantially increase crew workload.  If these speeds 
had been issued as part of a controller’s efforts to 
meet a time-based schedule (rather than simply a 
manipulation of a percentage around the profile) 
there are examples in the study where the schedule 
could not have been met.  However, crews accepted a 
surprising number of the “extreme” clearances with 
equanimity.  The twenty-percent-faster clearances 
seemed generally acceptable, except during the last 
few miles of the descent; and slow speeds were more 
acceptable if they did not require a change in the 
aircraft’s configuration.  While these findings do not 
provide a definitive scheme to assist researchers 
developing schedule-based algorithms and controller 
DSTs, they do suggest some key factors that, if taken 
into consideration may make some “extreme” 
clearances more likely to be accepted. 
A second finding was a large variation in the 
way crews flew the descents. The variation observed 
in this study may have important implications for the 
design of the ground decision support tools, 
suggesting that tolerance for this variability may need 
to be accounted for the in descent profile calculations 
for the ground automation.  In this simulation, this 
finding is summarized by the descent times, which 
varied by almost three minutes on the RIIVR route.   
Variations in descent times are the result of many 
factors that differed across the ten crews who 
participated: company procedures, personal flying 
style, strategies, and understanding of both energy 
management in general and the specific airplane FMS 
in particular.  For example, some crews chose to stay 
in an automated mode when they were flying (LNAV 
and VNAV) while others chose to fly with a lower 
level of automation (FLCH), some used speed brakes 
more readily than others, and some retracted their 
flaps after they had been deployed while others did 
not.   
Comments on Study Focus  
The key aim of this study was to explore the 
flight-crew-related assumptions inherent in the ATD1 
concept [1].  These were three-fold: crews could fly 
the descents, workload would not increase, and no 
training is required.  Although it was clear that flying 
these RNAV OPDs was feasible, crews did question 
the efficiency of a descent with multiple speed 
changes that required alternate uses of thrust and 
braking techniques. Thus, from an efficiency 
perspective, speed adjustments that remain closer to 
the nominal profile will be preferable to flight-crews. 
A degree of doubt was cast over the assumption 
that flight crew workload will not be impacted.  
While the load caused by the “extreme” speed 
clearances cannot be extracted from the results, there 
are some indications that general workload could be 
affected even by speeds closer to the profile. 
Observers noted crews needed to interact frequently 
with the FMS (to enter the waypoint speeds on the 
LEGS page) if they wanted the aircraft to stay on, 
and recalculate, the vertical profile of the descent. 
This activity possibly accounts for the higher 
workload ratings given by the non-flying pilot (when 
compared to the flying pilot) in three quarters of the 
Scenarios (shown in Figure 4).  Crew procedures also 
contributed to this load if they specified that every 
altitude constraint at a waypoint had to be dialed into 
the Mode Control Panel, rather than dialing it down 
to the lowest cleared altitude. Studies to specifically 
compare crew workload under different procedures 
and to compare workload on current day step-down 
profiles with OPDs will shed light on the degree to 
which CMS impacts flight crew workload. 
Crews were divided in their opinions of whether 
training is necessary to fly schedule-based OPDs, 
with the majority agreeing that a flight bulletin would 
be sufficient.  However, observing across all ten 
crews showed that, although everyone could achieve 
the descents, some crews achieved them far more 
efficiently than others.  Further analysis of the data is 
underway to describe crew styles and relate them to 
the quantifiable data but, at a very general level, it 
was observed that crews who used the automation 
more fully and effectively seemed less time pressured 
and more “ahead of the airplane”.  It may be that 
while crews do not require specific training on 
managing OPDs, more general training on FMS 
management and utilization would be beneficial.  
Conclusion 
This exploratory study was valuable as it 
establishes that the impacts of a schedule-based, 
controller managed concept on the current day (non-
FIM) flight-deck need to be considered as a part of 
the ATD1 research.  It highlighted a number of 
variables that were considered that need closer 
investigation (e.g., constraints on speed parameters, 
interpretation of conditional phraseology in 
clearances), and uncovered some additional variables 
that need to be studied (best procedures for OPDs, 
training requirements).  The observations indicated 
that some flight crews could manage large variations 
in speed instructions and effectively manage the 
aircraft automation to absorb some of the 
redistributed/ increased workload, but not all.  The 
most striking finding was the large variation in 
crews’ performance and, although some of this 
variation could be addressed through specific 
procedures and crew training, the importance of 
automation and time-based schedules having enough 
flexibility to absorb aircraft-by-aircraft variations was 
underlined. 
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